Prof. Dr. Hab. Zbigniew Wawer

At the end of April 1942, after the first evacuation of Polish troops from the USSR to Iran, the Supreme Commander, General Władysław Sikorski, ordered the creation of a two-division corps in the Middle East under the command of General Józef Zając (Commander of the Polish Army in the Middle East). At that time, there was also a Polish Army in the Soviet Union, commanded by General Władysław Anders.

On April 7, General Sikorski sent a telegram to General Józef Zając, in which he ordered the reorganization of the Independent Carpathian Rifle Brigade into a division. It was to consist of 578 officers and 8,419 privates. To fill this number, the Carpathian Brigade was to provide 287 officers and 3,436 privates, while the two divisions that had arrived from the USSR (9th and 10th) were to provide the newly formed unit with 293 officers and 6,050 privates.

On May 3, in Quastina, Palestine, a new division was formed by combining the 9th and 10th Infantry Divisions that had arrived from the USSR with the Independent Carpathian Rifle Brigade, which on May 9 was named the 3rd Carpathian Rifle Division under the command of General Kopański.

Initially, units of the 3rd Carpathian Rifle Division were deployed in the Quastin area. At the end of May, the division had 610 officers and 10,746 privates. At the same time, the formation of the 2nd Tank Brigade began under the command of General Gustaw Paszkiewicz.

In July, General Auchinleck decided to move the place of concentration of Polish units from Palestine to northern Iraq. At the same time, he proposed a new organization of Polish units, which assumed the creation of one two-division corps, a tank brigade and weapons and service units. It did not gain the approval of General Sikorski, who wrote in a telegram of August 1, 1942 to General Zając: “I will put this matter on the plane of governments in London – I would not like to fight Auchinleck’s projects, because I care about good relations to date. The organization of the Polish Army belongs to me. Political considerations also play a role in this matter, which put the creation of an army, not a corps, especially when it comes to the country.”

In the same dispatch, the Commander-in-Chief decided that a 61,000-strong Polish army would be created in the Middle East after the completion of the second evacuation from the USSR, consisting of two corps, each with two two-brigade infantry divisions supported by corps artillery and, at the army level, a tank brigade. The surplus of privates remaining after the reorganization was to be sent to Great Britain to supplement the air force, the parachute brigade and the armored division.

On August 3, the project of the new organization of the Polish Army in the Middle East was submitted to the War Office. The project was considered during the Polish-British conference on August 5 in London.

The British side was against the creation of the Polish army according to the proposal of General Sikorski, pointing to the insufficient strength of the army and the weak artillery and services. In connection with this, the matter of creating an army fell through and only a reinforced corps remained, consisting of two infantry divisions, each with two brigades and two light artillery regiments, and two tank brigades, weapons units and corps services. The final project of organizing Polish units was to be discussed with British and Polish commanders by the Chief of Staff of the Commander-in-Chief, General Tadeusz Klimecki, who was going to the Middle East.

On August 28, a Polish-British conference was held in Cairo under the chairmanship of General Henry Maitland Wilson, who proposed numerous changes in the organization of Polish units in the Middle East. The most important changes included strengthening the infantry division by one light artillery regiment, a reconnaissance regiment, and a heavy machine gun battalion. In addition, within the Polish Corps, General Wilson proposed reducing the anti-aircraft artillery from a brigade to one regiment and creating an independent rifle brigade instead of the second tank brigade. General Klimecki accepted these changes conditionally and left Cairo for Tehran to seek the opinion of General Anders. After familiarizing himself with the British proposals, General Anders wanted to introduce amendments to the agreed plan that would allow the name “army” to be retained. The most important Polish proposals included: organizing an infantry division from a tank brigade and an independent rifle brigade, which would retain the name of the 6th Infantry Division, and a reserve center from the 7th Division, which would be named the 7th Infantry Division. According to General Anders, these changes were to have a positive effect on the mood among soldiers withdrawn from the USSR, as they would continue to serve in their former units. General Klimecki passed these suggestions on to General Wilson, who agreed to them.

On September 12, General Sikorski approved the organization of the Polish Army in the East, abolishing all existing names. General Anders became the commander of the army, with General Zając as his deputy. From that moment on, the army consisted of the 3rd, 5th, 6th, and 7th Infantry Divisions. The new organization, officially adopted by the British in October, was a compromise between the army and the corps. Before the new organization of the Polish Army in the East was introduced, Polish troops began to arrive in Iraq. The first to arrive were soldiers evacuated from the USSR to Persia, who, after undergoing quarantine, were transported to Iraq by land. At the same time, the transport of units of the 3rd Carpathian Rifle Division began from Palestine by land through Transjordan and Syria to Iraq, and by sea through the Suez Canal to Basra.

The concentration area of ​​the Polish Army in Iraq designated by the British command was the Khanaqin – Qizil Ribat region located in the Tigris River basin in a rocky desert approximately 140 kilometers north-east of Baghdad. The only communication routes in this area were a narrow-gauge railway line from Baghdad and a mountain road leading from Persia to Khanaqin.

Due to hygienic and religious conditions, the army could not be accommodated in the villages and towns of this region. Khanaqin was a small town full of date palms and orange trees located on the Ab-i-Gilan River in the Tigris basin. The climate in this region was not conducive to improving the health of the army, whose soldiers were weakened and exhausted after their stay in the USSR.

The first transports of Polish troops from Persia crossed the border into Iraq on August 28, and the last on October 31, 1942.

When the heatwave ended in November and the rainy season arrived, the units began their normal activities. Despite the difficult climatic conditions and the varying levels of training and combat experience of the units, the army command reorganized large units between October and December 1942. The third rifle brigade in the 3rd Carpathian Rifle Division was liquidated and transferred, along with surpluses, to the 5th Infantry Division, which had been transferred from Russian to British service. The 6th Infantry Division was also reorganized, from that moment on consisting of the 6th Independent Rifle Brigade and the 2nd Tank Brigade, while the 7th Infantry Division was to serve as the Army Reserve Center. The artillery, services, and weapons of the army were also reorganized.

In the plans of the Paiforces (Persian and lraq Force), the Polish Army in the East was tasked with defending the mountain passes from the Persian side and protecting the oil fields in northern Iraq.

Gen. Wilson set the army’s combat readiness date for May 1, 1943 (only the 3rd Carpathian Rifle Division was supposed to be ready sooner). Issues concerning the defense plan and training were discussed at the Polish-British staff conference in Baghdad. During the meeting, it was decided to move the 3rd Carpathian Rifle Division to the Mosul area. In the second half of November, the 3rd Division arrived in the area, where it relieved the Indian 8th Infantry Division.

The march to the new staging area was used by the division commander, Gen. Stanisław Kopański, for exercises in a team march for the commanders of individual units and drivers. The climatic conditions were very difficult. Due to the constant rain, the tents had to be dug very deep into the ground. Low temperatures forced the soldiers to make their own stoves from tin oil cans. There was no lighting for the tents until kerosene lamps were purchased, because there were no other ones. There was also a lack of water sources in the area, which had to be brought daily from a greater distance, which, given the poor road network, caused quite a few problems. Although the 3rd Divisional Carrier Division was the best armed and equipped division in the Polish Army in the East, it still lacked full equipment: 56% of anti-tank guns, 86% of anti-aircraft guns, 90% of armoured cars, 30% of carriers, 80% of semi-trucks, etc. This equipment slowly arrived at the division. At the same time, the remaining Polish divisions received equipment and weapons. The Polish units spent the winter in intensive training.

The 5th, 6th and 7th Infantry Divisions remained in the Khanquin – Qizil Ribat area due to its location on the main communication route from Persia to Iraq. This allowed for the rapid transfer of Polish units to the defense of the passes in the Sulaimaniya – Penjawin area in the event of a German threat to the mountain passes between Persia (Iran) and Iraq.

In January 1943, when the German armies were forced to retreat, the threat to the oil fields in Persia and Iraq had passed. On January 6, the new commander of Paiforces, General Pownall, developed a defense plan. The 3rd Carpathian Rifle Division was ordered to fortify the passes in the direction of Rawneduz – Koji Sanjag, and the remaining divisions in the direction of Penjwin and As Sulaymaniyah.

After the first training period, General Anders, in agreement with the Commander-in-Chief, decided to reorganize the army, adapting its organization to the existing personnel. The 6th Infantry Division was disbanded, incorporating the 6th Rifle Brigade into the 5th Infantry Division, which received the name of the 5th Kresowa Infantry Division, and its brigades were given the names of Volhynian and Lviv. The 2nd Tank Brigade became independent, and the personnel of the 7th Infantry Division were reduced.

On March 15, the Paiforces command ordered General Anders to prepare the units subordinate to him for future landing operations and mountain warfare. In order to prepare the units for future combat, the army command decided to adapt its organization to new tasks by separating the army command in the field and the Army Base and Staff Command headed by Brig. Gen. Wiatr. In connection with the reorganization, in April, the Chief of Staff of the Commander-in-Chief, Gen. Klimecki, arrived in the Middle East, who after familiarizing himself with the project approved the idea.

In April, the Polish Army in the East was moved to the Kirkuk – Altun Kupri area, and in the Khanaquin – Qizil Ribat area only the command of the base and army stages remained. In this way, the territorial separation of the army took place. At the time of the army’s move, a hot summer began. The heat was very oppressive, despite this, intensive exercises were conducted.

The heatwave favored the development of numerous diseases. The greatest devastation in the ranks was caused by the return of the malaria epidemic, which affected about 5,000 soldiers. In addition, there were numerous sunstrokes and digestive tract diseases. The average sickness rate in the Polish Army in the Middle East during its stay in Iraq was about 15 percent of its full-time strength.

In the Kirkuk area, Polish units mostly performed guard duty at strategically important facilities. During their stay, Polish soldiers were prohibited from leaving the camps due to the possibility of disarmament by Kurdish fighters. It is worth emphasizing that apart from minor incidents, during which several Polish posts were disarmed by the Kurds, the attitude of the local population was very friendly. Polish soldiers often provided food for Kurdish children.

On May 27, General Sikorski arrived in Cairo. His arrival was prompted by numerous reports reaching London about a mutiny brewing in the Polish Army in the East against the Commander-in-Chief. On June 1, the Commander-in-Chief flew to Kirkuk. During the inspection that lasted until June 17, the Commander-in-Chief visited the camps of the 3rd Carpathian Rifle Division and the 5th Kresowa Infantry Division.

On June 8, a major review of the Polish Army in the East took place, attended by delegations from all army units and the 3rd Carpathian Rifle Division.

After the inspection, the Commander-in-Chief issued many orders, the most important of which was to select a tactical unit from the Polish Army in the East, which was given the name of the 2nd Corps. Contrary to the suggestions of many Polish politicians, the Commander-in-Chief left General Anders in the position of army commander, considering him an excellent organizer and an outstanding commander. The inspection of the Polish army in Iraq was excellent. In this most loyal of loyal troops, there could be no talk of a mutiny against the Commander-in-Chief.

On July 13, Prime Minister Churchill wrote in a letter to General Hastings Ismay: “the time has come to move the Polish troops from Persia to the Mediterranean. It is politically extremely desirable, because these soldiers want to fight, and once engaged, their worries about their own affairs, which are tragic, will be reduced. The Corps should move as a whole to Port Said and Alexandria. It is intended to use it in Italy. We have five months to turn our whole force against Italy.”

General Anders received information about the transfer of the 2nd Corps to Italy from the Paiforces command on July 21, and five days later a plan for the transport of Polish units to Palestine arrived.

On July 21, the new organization of the Polish Army came into effect. On the same day, General Anders received an order from the Paiforces command to move Polish units to Palestine.

The next day, the commander of the Middle East, Gen. Wilson, informed Gen. Anders that he expected the Polish 2nd Corps to achieve combat readiness to perform any operational task from 1 January 1944. The APW had 6,019 officers, 58,526 privates and 3,084 volunteers from the Women’s Auxiliary Military Service. Of this number, 3,099 officers, 49,030 privates and 559 volunteers were in the 2nd Corps. Of the remaining soldiers who were part of army units, only 720 officers and 3,582 privates from the 7th Infantry Division and the Army Training Centre were a personnel reserve – the first supplementation of the 2nd Corps. This was only 16 percent, instead of the 20 percent reserve for fighting units that the British had planned. Soon, Polish units were moved to Palestine.

At that time, as a result of agitation by Jewish circles, an action was launched calling on Polish soldiers of Jewish origin to desert. Many articles were published in the American and left-wing British press accusing Poles of anti-Semitism. As a result of this action, several thousand Jews deserted from the ranks of the APW and the 2nd Corps in Palestine. Despite the reduction in the strength of many units and the weakening of the combat readiness of these units, General Anders ordered that no legal action be taken to search for deserters. In doing so, he refused to help the British side in pursuing these people in Palestine. After these events, 1,300 soldiers of Jewish origin remained in the APW, who fulfilled their patriotic duty until the end of the war by fighting in the Italian campaign of 1944-45.

On September 18, the Chief of the Imperial Staff, General Allan Brooke, in a letter to General Sosnkowski, proposed consent to transfer one Polish infantry division from the 2nd Corps to the Italian front. The Polish Commander-in-Chief agreed to send the 3rd Infantry Division to the front, but only on condition that the entire 2nd Corps would be sent after it shortly.

On September 20, General Sosnkowski informed General Anders of his findings, writing: “the use of the Polish Corps in ME operations, as a whole under the command of a Polish general, is in the interest of both Poland and the Allies. Dividing the Corps and using it operationally by individual divisions cannot have a negative impact on the morale of the troops and their combat value. […] From the national point of view, the use of the Corps as a whole is of great importance to me.” The Commander-in-Chief believed that the Polish Corps could enter the front in its entirety from January 1, 1944. He informed the commander of the 2nd Corps that he had agreed with the Chief of the Imperial Staff on the possibility of sending the 3rd Division into combat operations earlier. “We have established with the General in the form of a “gentleman’s agreement” that the remaining units of the Polish Corps in the East will join the 3rd Division as soon as the training of these remaining units is completed and their combat readiness is achieved. Any operational needs that may arise in the meantime in other theatres of war will not violate the principle of employing the Corps as a whole and will not lead to the use of its units in different theatres of war.”

The Commander-in-Chief drew General Anders’ attention to the fact that if the 3rd Division were sent to the front first, it would not be directed to a landing operation from the sea, nor would it perform occupation functions.

Ultimately, the 3rd Division was not sent to the Italian front on its own, which was due to General Anders, who, in talks with the commander of the British 9th Army, General William Holmes, asked for another Allied division to be sent to the front, justifying his request with the need to further train and equip the 3rd Infantry Division and to coordinate the entire 2nd Corps.

At that time, in the mountains of Syria, the 1st Carpathian Rifle Brigade was undergoing mountain warfare training. Thanks to this, by October 13, 1943, the entire 3rd Carpathian Rifle Division had completed mountain warfare training.

On October 21, the 2nd Corps held a major exercise. It went very well. The only problem that complicated the coordination of infantry, armor, and artillery at that time was the re-equipment of most units with new weapons. For example, the 2nd Armored Brigade received new Sherman tanks at that time, which forced the internal reorganization of the Brigade – changes in the tactical and technical training of commanders and tank crews. In connection with this, General Anders expected the unit’s training to end only at the end of January 1944.

In early November 1943, General Sosnkowski arrived in the Middle East. On November 6, a meeting was held in Algiers with the Supreme Commander of the Mediterranean Area, General Dwight Eisenhower. The subject of the conference was the organization of the 2nd Corps. The Allied command believed that in the absence of the required 20 percent complement of full-time personnel, the 2nd Corps should be reduced to one three-brigade infantry division, an armored brigade and a limited number of corps units. The Polish Commander-in-Chief proposed that in such a case he would prefer the infantry division to remain a two-brigade unit, while instead of an armored brigade, a new type of armored division would be created. Thanks to this reorganization, a personnel reserve of about 4,000 men would be created. General Eisenhower left this matter to the commander of the 15th Army Group operating on the Italian front.

On December 7, the final decision was made to send the Polish 2nd Corps to Italy. After the 2nd Corps left Egypt, the Command of Military Units in the Middle East remained there under the command of General Karaszewicz-Tokarzewski.

From December 1943 to February 1944 the 2nd Corps was transferred to the Italian front.